By Yilma Bekele: The selling of Ethiopia

Actually that statement might not be true. We do know our country is being sold but we have no idea if the bidding has been open or closed. We have sold almost all of Gambella, we have leased half of Afar and Oromia has been parceled out bit by bit. Our Beer factories are under new owners, our gold mines belong to the fake Ethiopian sheik, Telephone is under the Chinese and our Airlines is looking for a suitor. Have we always looked for outsiders to own us?

Not really when you consider that we celebrated the victory at the battle of Adwa a few weeks back and that was the mother of all wars that made it clear this African country is not for sale.  We might not have contributed much to the industrial revolution but we did manage to rely on our own ingenuity to follow along and do things our own way. You might not believe this but there was a time when Ethiopians actually used to be involved in making stuff from scratch. You think I am making things up don’t you? I don’t blame you because today you cannot even come up with one name that stands out as an Ethiopian entrepreneur, go getter  or  someone that shines like the north star based solely on his own sweat and blood.

The things that were accomplished by earlier Ethiopians are all around us but we don’t see them.  All the things the current government brags about have their roots in the yester years they so much condemn and brush off. I don’t know where to start but here we go. Let us start with hospitals.  Bella Haile Selassie (Bella), Leelt Tshay (armed Forces),  Paulos, Haile Selassie Hospital (Yekati 12), Balcha, Ghandi, Tikur Anbessa, Ras Desta, Minilik etc.  The vast majority of the doctors were Ethiopians, the hospitals were clean, well equipped and you don’t even have to take your own sheets and blankets.

How about Hotels? Ethiopia, Ghion, Wabi Shebele, Ras, Bekele Molla were the premier destinations. They were owned and operated by Ethiopians. When it comes to Ethiopian Airlines the Pilots were proud Ethiopians and the technicians were the envy of Africa. The Imperial government built the Airlines from scratch. Trans World Airlines (TWA) was a partner until we were able to train and staff our own and we did manage to do that.

If we talk about agriculture we did manage to establish the Sugar estates of Metehara and Wonji not to mention Setit Humera, the wheat and corn fields of Arsi, the fiber plants of Sidama and the cotton fields of Awash Valley are testimonial to our ingenuity. The sixties saw the emergence of the new educated Ethiopians that raised the bar of excellence.

The establishment of Africa Hall was how Africans showed respect to our Emperor and our old history when they choose Addis Abeba as the head quarter for the continent. The University at sadist Kilo was a gift to his people by the Emperor and it was a spectacular success. All the teachers were highly educated Ethiopians and the graduates were the pride of our country.

Why am I discussing such subject today? It is because two items reported by the media caught my eye a few days back. Both are an assault on our sovereignty and our ability to grow our own economy by Ethiopians for Ethiopians. Heineken a Dutch conglomerate is building the biggest brewery in Ethiopia and Guangdong Chuan Hui Group from China is given 41,000 Sq. meter of land to construct hotel and industrial complex. The way the story is being reported we should be jumping with joy. What could be better than those two benevolent multi nationals investing so much in our poor destitute country?

Is that how we should look at it?  Is there another aspect to this story? In order to see the pros and con of the question posed In front of us it would have been nice if there has been a nationwide discussion to see if the plan makes sense when it comes to our homeland. That is how smart decisions are made. Open and vibrant nationwide discussion regarding such important issues that impact our national economy and our people’s well-being assures a better outcome.

That usually is not the case in our country. There are no checks and balances. There is no independent legislative body and the judiciary is a government tool. A single party the TPLF controls all and everything in the country. Our political leaders have no faith in the ability of the people to know what is good for them. That is why they approach their job as being a ‘baby sitter’ and are constantly fretting about what the people hear and read. Decisions are made by a few TPLF politburo members to be approved by the rubber stamp Parliament. Anyone that questions such a decision is branded as enemy of the people and dealt with.

Let us start with our beer story. You know beer is nothing but European Tella. It is bottled fancy and costs a little bit more. How long ago do you think we acquired the idea of brewing for a larger crowd? Eighty years ago my friend! St George brewery was started in 1922. Meta Abo Brewery was founded in 1963. Meta Abo was a partnership between government and private capital and started with a base capital of 2million Birr. The military junta nationalized both and the current TPLF Woyane regime inherited them with the rest of Ethiopia. What do you think these successive regimes did with our own old industry and land? Did they build on what was started? Did they reinvest the profit to make the enterprises bigger and better? Did they run our industries, enterprises and farms in a responsible and judicious manner?

Both St. George and Meta Abo are no more Ethiopian enterprises. BGI (an internationally acclaimed Brewing Company that operates in many countries.??) bought St George in 1998 for US 10 million ‘through foreign direct investment’(??)  Meta Ambo was sold to Diego Industries-a British congalmorate for US 225 million. Heineken a Dutch multi-national acquired 18% of Bedele and Harar breweries for US 163 million in 2011.  Raya Brewery an idea that has not materialized yet but promoted by Lt. General Tsadkan W.Tensai and investors such as  Yemane (Jamaica) Kidane and other TPLF officials sold 25% interest to BGI for 650 million Br and invited Brewtech a German company as a partner.

As you can see the TPLF regime collected close to US 400 million from the sale of our home grown breweries. By all imagination that is chump change when you consider the ownership is lost and the profit for eternity belongs to the foreigners. Is this a good way to grow a national economy? Has it been done before or is this another of that failed ‘revolutionary democracy’ pipe dream?

BGI, Diego or Heineken are investing in our country to realize profit for their shareholders. What is our country getting out of this? The beer manufacturing business is a highly automated enterprise so it is not about job creation. Most if not all of the high paying managerial jobs will be occupied by the parent company. The malt, barley and other ingredients are imported and are considered a trade secret. We all know about creative accounting thus I am sure our country does not even benefit from the profit because the bookkeeping is rigged to minimize taxes.

Let us not even think of technology transfer since we cannot learn what we have already mastered. Remember we have been brewing beer since 1922. I will tell you what we got out of this unequal relationship. We as a people got royally screwed. The TPLF party officials got paid plenty for their pimping effort. The regime in its insatiable appetite for foreign currency bought a few months of respite to purchase oil, wheat, cooking oil etc. to postpone its inevitable collapse.

There are certain things we know how a growing economy with a nationalist government operates. We have seen how China, India, Malaysia, Brazil and other emerging economies handled their growth potential. They use what is known as subsidy to protect their infant industries from foreign predators. They allowed investment where technology transfer will bring benefit to their people but shielded their home grown industries from foreign competition.

Why do you think the TPLF bosses are interested in selling our sovereignty?  I doubt it is because they are anti-Ethiopian even though the late evil PM used to suffer from inferiority complex when it comes to central highlanders. I believe it is because of their ‘get rich quick’ philosophy. They are in a hurry to accumulate before their Ponzi scheme comes crashing down. According to the UN billions of dollars are leaving our country. They are buying properties in the US and Europe, sending their children to expensive schools abroad and vacationing in exotic places with the money they steal from our country.

What are we the victims doing about this rape and pillage of our resources and the degradation of our national pride?  I am afraid other than insistently talking there is nothing more most of us are doing about it. Why do you think that is so? I could think of a few things but ignorance comes to mind first and foremost. Our ignorance prevents us from connecting the dots and looking at the bigger picture. Our misplaced pride does not allow us to listen to others and learn to be able to formulate better solutions to our problems.

Today we have a population that is not familiar with its history. Sixty four percent (64%) of our people are under twenty five years old while twenty nine percent (29%) are under the age of 54 years. We have a toxic population on our hands. Those under twenty five grew up under the Woyane regime where being an Ethiopian is taken as a liability. While those under fifty four are the result of the Derge era of undermining religion, family, and stability. Ninety three (93%) of our population is a fertile ground for evil Woyane to plant shame, doubt and insecurity about being Ethiopian.

It is this population that is sitting on the side and cheering the selling of their country. For most people what bothers them is not what is lost but they spend endless energy to get a piece of the action. In Ethiopia stealing, lying, being part of a criminal enterprise is encouraged by the regime. When the recently dead Meles Zenawi said ‘even being a thief requires being smart’ he was giving a green light to his cadres and the population at large. The so called Diaspora is the number one enabler of the criminal Woyane machine. They use their new found riches to bribe Woyane so they could acquire stolen land to build their flimsy unsustainable condominiums and spend endless nights worrying if the next highest bidder will in turn take it away in broad day light.

This is exactly the reason we are having a problem forming a united front to get rid of this cancerous body in our midst. This is the reason even in exile we are unable to form a democratic, inclusive and worthy association that will benefit the many. The ninety three percent are in need of education in civic affairs and a dose of what it means to love your neighbor as you would love yourself.

May be it is the lords way of teaching us little humility and humbleness as he did with the children of Israel when he left them to wonder for forty years in the wilderness so they know what is in their heart. It is a choice we have-to be humble or perish due to pride.

http://allafrica.com/stories/201107051138.html?page=2

http://www.diageo.com/en-ie/newsmedia/pages/resource.aspx?resourceid=1168

http://blogs.ft.com/beyond-brics/2013/03/07/heineken-to-build-ethiopias-biggest-beer-factory/#axzz2MxqCwlH1

http://allafrica.com/stories/201107051138.html

SOURCE http://ecadforum.com/2013/03/16/by-yilma-bekele-the-selling-of-ethiopia/

UN Held Talks About Ethiopian Asylum Seekers In Norway

ABBY MINDA[MT] Finally, the international community gives concern for Ethiopian refugees in Norway. Human right defenders are still struggling against the repatriation agreement held on Jan 26,2012 between the dictatorial Meles regime  and the Norwegian government.

On the 35th meeting 19th Session of the Human Rights Council. SAFED, General Debate – Item: 4, 35th Meeting Reports of the 19th Session African Association of Education for Development  Ms Girma Chenet on her speech focused mostly on woman’s and children who are direct victims of human trafficking.

She also mentioned about the current situation in Ethiopia by presenting amnesty’s report about the abuse torture and inhuman handling of Ethiopians. She strongly asks the chairman by underlining on the point that ” Norway is carrying out an inhuman decision.” She also accused the Ethiopian government to be held responsible.

WATCH THE VIDEO

source http://www.abamela.com/un-held-talks-about-ethiopian-asylum-seekers-in-norway/oslo2/

ዶ/ር ያዕቆብ ኃይለማርያም እና ሌሎች ታዋቂ ሰዎች ዛሬ ታሰሩ
የኢህአዴግ አፋኝ አስተዳደር የአፓርታይድ ቅርጽ እየያዘ ነው!
ዛሬ መጋቢት ስምንት ቀን 2005 ዓ.ም ከጠዋቱ 3 ሰዓት ለኢትዮጵያ ተቆርቋሪ የግል ተነሳሽነት ማህበር፤ ሰማያዊ ፓርቲ እና ባለራዕ ወጣቶች ማህበር በጋራ በመሆን “ለፋሽስቱ የጦር ወንጀለኛ ለማርሻል ግራዚያኒ ክብር መስጠት የአባቶቻችን መስዋዕትነት ማራከስ ነው” በሚል የተጠራውን ሰልፍ አምባገኑ የኢህአዴግ መንግስት በርካታ የፌደራል ፖሊስ፣ የደህንነት አባላትን እና የአዲስ አበባ ፖሊሶችን በማሰማራት ሲበትን፤ የተቋማቱን ከፍተኛ አመራሮች፤ ታዋቂ ግለሰቦች እና በርካታ ወጣቶች ጨምሮ ቢያንስ 34 ሰዎች አስሯል የታሳሪዎች ቁጥር አሁንም በመጨመር ላይ ነው፡፡
እንዲሁም በትላንትናው እለት ለተቃውሞ ሰልፉ የቅስቀሳ ስራ ሲሰሩ ከነበሩት ውስጥ 2 የሰማያዊ ፓርቲ የስራ አስፈጻሚ አባላትን እንዲሁም የባለራዕይ ወጣቶች የስራ አስፈጻሚ አባላትን ጨምሮ 8 ሰዎችን አስረዋል፡፡
በአሁኑ ሰአት በእስር ላይ የሚገኙት እና ስማቸው የተገኘ
1. ዶ/ር ያዕቆብ ኃ/ማርያም
2. አቶ ታዲዎስ ታንቱ
3. አቶ ይልቃል ጌትነት (የሰማያዊ ሊቀመንበር)
4. ስለሺ ፈይሳ (የሰማያዊ ም/ሊቀመንበር)
5. ይድነቃቸው ከበደ (የሰማያዊ የህግ ጉዳይ ሀላፊ)
6. ሀና ዋለልኝ (የሰማያዊ የሴቶች ጉዳይ ሀላፊ)
7. ጌታነህ ባልቻ (የሰማያዊ የድርጅት ጉዳይ ሀላፊ)
8. ብርሀኑ ተክለያሬድ (የባለራዕይ ወጣቶች ተ/ምክትል ሊቀመንበር)
9. ያሬድ አማረ (የባለራዕይ ወጣቶች ማህበር ጸሀፊ)
10. ኤልሳቤጥ ወሰኔ
11. ሰለሞን ወዳጅ
12. ወይንሸት ንጉሴ
13. እየሩሳሌም ተስፋው
14. ለገሰ ማሞ
15. ትዕግስት ተገኝ
16. አማኑኤል ጊዲና
17. አለማየሁ ዘለቀ
18. አገኘሁ አሰገድ
19. ሻሚል ከድር
20. አሸብር ኪያር
21. ጌታቸው ሽፈራው
22. ግሩም አበራ
23. አቤል ሙሉ
24. ዩሀንስ ጌታቸው
25. ስማቸው ተበጀ
26. ፍቃዱ ወንዳፍራው
27. ባህረን እሸቱ
28. ሄኖክ መሀመድ
29. እንቢበል ሰርጓለም
30. አለማየሁ በቀለ
31. ዩናስ
32. የመኪናው ሹፌር
33. ዮዲት አገዘ
34. ጥላዬ ታረቀኝ
ethioforem.org

በሚዲያ መረሳት ያስፈራል

“ከምድር በታች ጨለማ ቤት ውስጥ የታሰሩትን በቀን ለ10 ደቂቃ እናያቸዋልን። ልብ የሚነካ ነው። የብርሃን ማነስ አይናቸውን እንደጎዳቸው ያስታውቃሉ … ሴቶችን በተገኘው ሰበብ ያስሯቸዋል። ምክንያት ፈልገው እስር ቤት ይከቷቸዋል። ከዚያም ይደፍሯቸዋል። በርካታ የተደፈሩ እህቶች አሉ። የኢትዮጵያ መከላከያ ሰራዊትና መንግሥት ያሰማራቸው ሚሊሻዎች ይህንን አሳዛኝ ድርጊት እንደፈጸሙ ተነግሮናል” ይህ ማዕከላዊ እስር ቤት ታስሮ፣ ችግሩ ባለበት ቦታ ተገኝቶ የነበረው ስዊድናዊ የፍሪላንሰር ጋዜጠኛ ማርቲን ካርል ሻቢዬ ቃል ነው።

ስለ ማዕከላዊ እስር ቤት መስማት ይጨንቃል። ሰዎች በሲቃ የሚያሰሙት የጣር ድምጽ ለጆሮ  የተለመደ ነው። ከመሬት በታች የጨለማ ክፍል አለ። በዚህ መታጎሪያ ውስጥ ሆነው ስቃይ የሚፈራረቅባቸው ወገኖች ጥቂት አይደሉም። ማዕከላዊ ብዙ ጉድ ያለበት ሲኦል ነው። የሰው ልጆች በግፍ ማቅቀውበታል። እየማቀቁበትም ነው። ለውጥ እስከሌለ ድረስ የሚቆም አይመስልም። በመሃላ የሚነገርለት ውርስና ይቀጥላል የሚባለው የመለስ ራዕይ አንዱ ክፍል ይህ ነው።

መጋቢት 3፤2005 (3/12/2013) በኖርዌይ ኦስሎ የሥነጽሁፍ ቤት (ሊትሬቸር ሀውስ) በተዘጋጀ የመወያያ መድረክ ላይ ሁለቱ ስዊድናውያን ጋዜጠኞች ተገኝተው ነበር። መድረኩን ያዘጋጀው ደግሞ NOAS በሚል ስያሜ የሚታወቀው የስደተኞች ተሟጋች ድርጅት ነው። የተቋሙ ዋና ዳይሬክተር አን-ማግሬት ኦስቴና ሁለቱን እንግዶች ካስተዋወቁ በኋላ መድረኩን እየመሩ ውይይቱ ተካሄደ። በዚህ ውይይት ላይ ሁለቱ ጋዜጠኞች እየተፈራረቁ የደረሰባቸውንና በትክክል ያዩትን አስታወቁ።

ማርቲን ካርል ሻቢዬና ባልደረባው የፎቶ ጋዜጠኛ ጆሃን ካርል አበክረው የሚናገሩት ስለ ሙያቸው ነው። “ጋዜጠኛ ለመጻፍ ማየትና ማነጋገር አለበት። በተለያዩ አገራት ጋዜጠኞች ችግር ባለባቸው ቦታዎች ገብተው ለመዘገብ ድንበር ያቋርጣሉ። አሁን በሶሪያ፣ ቀደም ሲል በሊቢያ የሆነው ይህ ነው። በኢትዮጵያ ግን ሽብርተኛ ያሰኛል” ሲሉ ግርምታቸውን ይጀምራሉ።

የ19 ዓመት ወጣት ነው። ስራዉ ሹፍርና ሲሆን “ኦነግ ነህ” ተብሎ ነው የታሰረው። መርማሪዎች ባዶ ወረቀት እየሰጡ ስለ ኦነግ ጻፍ ይሉታል። ምንም የሚያውቀው ነገር ስላልነበር መጻፍ አልቻለም። በመጨረሻ ራሳቸው ጽፈው አዘጋጅተው በራስህ እጅ ጽሁፍ ገልብጥ አሉት። እናም የተባለውን ፈጸመ። ጋዜጠኞቹ ብዙ መረጃ አላቸው። እነሱንም ያልሆኑትንና ያላደረጉትን አድርገናል እንዲሉ መደረጋቸውን አስታውቀዋል። “በሶማሊያ አምስት ዓመት ተቀምጫለሁ እንድል አስገድደው አሳመኑኝ” በማለት ጆሃን ካርል ገለጸ።

ወ/ሮ ዙፋን አማረ

የኢትዮጵያ ስደተኞች ማህበር በኖርዌይ ሊቀመንበር ወ/ሮ ዙፋን አማረ እንደሚሉት ሁለቱ ጋዜጠኞች ኖርዌይ እንዲመጡ ከላይ ከተጠቀሰው ድርጅት ጋር ከመነጋገር ጀምሮ ማህበራቸው የበኩሉን ስለማድረጉ ይናገራሉ። ይህ እንዲሆን የታሰበው ደግሞ ጋዜጠኞቹ በትክክል ያዩትንና የደረሰባቸውን ለኖርዌይ ባለስልጣናት በማስረዳት በኢትዮጵያ ላይ የያዙትን አቋም እንዲያስተካክሉ የሚደረገውን የቅንጅት ትግል ለማጠናከር እንደሆነ ወ/ሮ ዙፋን ያስረዳሉ።

ሁለቱ ጋዜጠኞችም ያሰመሩበት ጉዳይ ይህንኑ ነው። ኖርዌይ የመጡበት ዋናው ምክንያት ከተለያዩ ፖለቲከኞች፣ አግባብ ካላቸው መስሪያ ቤቶችና ከዋናው ፓርላማ በመገኘት ስለ ኢትዮጵያ ማስረዳታቸውን ተናግረዋል። በርግጠኛነት ባለስልጣናቱ ያገኙትን መረጃ ለመልካም ይጠቀሙበታል ብለው እንደሚያምኑ ተናግረዋል።

ዶ/ር ሙሉዓለም

ኢትዮጵያዊያን ባሉበትና የስደተኞች ጉዳይ በሚነሳበት ሁሉ የማይጠፉት ዶ/ር ሙሉዓለም አዳም የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ስለሚፈጽመው በደልና ግፍ ለማስረዳት ብዙ መደከሙን፣ እነሱም ቢሆን የኢትዮጵያ መንግስት ምን አይነት መንግስት እንደሆነ እንደሚያውቁ፣ መንግስትም ራሱን ሊሰውር ቢል የሚፈጽመው ተግባሩ ከግብሩ ሊሰወር እንደማያስችለው በሚያስረዳ መልኩ አስተያየት ከሰጡ በኋላ “”እነዚህን ሰዎች እኮ አቁሙ የሚላቸው የለም። የምታውቁትን ያስረዳችኋቸው ባለስልጣናትና ፖለቲከኞች ምን ምላሽ ሰጡ?” የሚል ሁሉንም የሚወክል ጥያቄ አቀረቡ።

በተደራራቢ ስብሰባና በውይይት መዳከማቸውን የገለጹት ሁለቱ ጋዜጠኞች “የኖርዌይ ባለስልጣናትና ፖለቲከኞች ያገኙትን መረጃ ለበጎ ይጠቀሙበታል የሚል እምነት አለን” በማለት መልስ ሰጥተዋል። ስለ አውሮፓና አሜሪካ ዝምታ ለተጠየቁት የመለሱት አሸባሪነትን በመዋጋት ስም ከፍተኛ ገንዝብ እንደሚገኝ በመግለጽ ነው። በምስራቅ አፍሪካ የፖለቲካው መልክ የተወሳሰበ በመሆኑ ኢህአዴግም ይህንኑ እንደሚጠቀምበት አመላክተዋል። አሜሪካንና እንግሊዝን ኮንነዋል።

ስለ ኢህአዴግ የስለላ መረብና በስደት ላይ በሚገኙ ወገኖች ላይ ስላሰማራቸው ጆሮ ጠቢዎች አስተያየት እንዲሰጡ ለቀረበላቸው ጥያቄ፣ አገር ቤት ያስተዋሉትንና ያላቸውን መረጃ በማጣቀስ አድማጮችን አስፈግገዋል። በካፌና ተራ መዝናኛ ቦታዎች ጆሮ ጠቢዎች እንደሚሰማሩ፣ ሰዎች ሻይ እየጠጡ የሚያወሩትን እንደሚለቅሙ፣ በመገረም ተናግረዋል። ስደተኞችን መሰለልና መቆጣጠር አደገኛ ወንጀል እንደሆነ በሃዘን ስሜት አስረድተዋል።

እስር ቤት “ግምገማ አለ” በማለት ግምገማ የምትለዋን የአማርኛ ቃል ተጠቅመው ማብራሪያ ሰጥተዋል። እስር ቤት ውስጥ ባለው ግምገማ 100 ነጥብ የሚያገኙ ይቅርታ እንደሚያገኙ፣ 10 ወይም ከዚያ በታች የሚያገኙ ደግሞ ተቃራኒው እንደሚተገበርባቸው እየሳቁ የኢህአዴግን የቆሸሸ አካሄድ ተናግረዋል።

የኖርዌይ PEN (ፔን) ምክትል ፕሬዚዳንት የሆኑት ፕሮፌሰር ኤሊሳቤጥ ኤዲ “በሽርክና ላይ የተመሰረተ ፖሊሲ” ሲሉ የጠሩትን የአገራቸውንና የኢትዮጵያን ግንኙነት የገለጹት በተደጋጋሚ ኢትዮጵያ እንደሚመላለሱ መግለጽ ነው። እርሳቸውን ተከትሎ አቶ ዳዊት መሰረታዊ ጉዳዮችን አንስተው ጥያቄ የሰነዘሩ ሲሆን፣ በማዕከላዊ ምርመራ እስር ቤት ውስጥ መርማሪዎቹ እርስ በርስ የሚነጋገሩበት ቋንቋ በኢትዮጵያ ከሚነገሩት ቋንቋዎች የትኛው እንደሆነ እንዲያስረዱ ያቀረቡት ጥያቄ ፖለቲካዊ ፋይዳ ያለውና አፈናውን የሚያካሂዱትን ቡድኖች የሚያጋልጥ በመሆኑ ከስብሰባው በኋላ መነጋገሪያም ነበር። የጎልጉል ዘጋቢ ያነጋገራቸው አንድ የኖርዌይ ተወላጅ በጥያቄው መነሳት መገረማቸውን አስረድተዋል። ጥያቄው የቀረበላቸው ጋዜጠኞች ግን በተለይ ቡድን ለይተው አልመለሱም። ይሁንና በቅርቡ በሚያሳትሙት መጽሃፍ ብዙ ጉዳዮች እንደሚነሱ አመልክተዋል።

የኢትዮጵያ ስደተኞች ማህበር በኖርዌይ የህዝብ ግንኙነት ሃላፊ አቶ ጌዲዮን ደሳለኝ ስለ እስክንድር ነጋ አንስተው ነበር። የማህበሩ ጸሐፊ አቶ ቢኒያም በውይይቱ ላይ ከተገኙት መካከል የሚጠቀሱ ሲሆኑ፣ ሊቀመንበሯ ወ/ሮ ዙፋን በማህበራቸው ስም ከፍተኛ ምስጋና በማቅረብ ከሰብአዊ መብት መጣስ ጋር በተያያዘ ጥያቄ አንስተው ነበር።

ጋዜጠኛ እስክንድር ነጋ አስቀድሞ በመታሰሩ የመገናኘት እድል እንዳላገኙ ያስረዱት ሁለቱ ጋዜጠኞች፣ ርዕዮት ዓለሙን እንዳገኙዋት፣ መነጋገር ስለማይቻል በምልክት ለመግባባት ይሞክሩ እንደነበር አስታውሰዋል። ከዚሁ ጋር አያይዘውም “እነዚህ ጋዜጠኞች የታሰሩት በመጻፋቸው ነው። የተከሰሱት ስለጻፉ ነው። ጋዜጠኞቹ ሲጽፉ ይህ እንደሚደርስባቸው ያውቁ ነበር። ሃላፊነቱን ራሳቸው ወስደው ጻፉ። አገራቸውን ስለሚወዱ፣ ሙያቸውን ስለሚያከብሩ፣ ህዝባቸውን ስለሚያፈቅሩ አደረጉት። ለነሱ ልዩ ክብር አለን” ብለዋል፡፡

“እስር ቤት እያለን አንድ ስጋት ነበረን” አሉ የስዊድን ጋዜጠኞች “ፍርሃታችን የስዊድን ጋዜጦች ስለኛ መጻፍ እንዳያቆሙ ነበር። የስዊድን ሚዲያዎች ስለኛ መጻፍ ካቆሙ እንረሳለን። መወያያ አጀንዳ የምንሆነው ካልተረሳን ብቻ ነው … ” በማለት የሚዲያን የመቀስቀስ ኃይል አጉልተው አሳይተዋል። አሁን በእስር ላይ ያሉት ጋዜጠኞች “ከመቃብር በታች ናቸው” በማለት ሁሉም ሚዲያዎች ሊረሷቸው እንደማይገባ የሚያስገነዝብ ውድ መልዕክት አስተላልፈዋል። “ነጻ ፕሬስ ከሌለ ለአገር አደጋ ነው። ነጻ ፕሬስ የሌለበት አገር አስተማማኝ መረጋጋት አይኖርም” ሲሉ የነጻ ሚዲያን አስፈላጊነት አስምረውበታል።

ጋዜጠኞቹ መጽሃፋቸውን በቅርቡ ጽፈው ለህትመት አስኪያበቁ ድረስ ዝርዝር ጉዳዮች በሚዲያ ላለመስጠት መወሰናቸው አስቀድሞ በስብሰባው አዘጋጆች በመነገሩ የሪፖርቱ አቅራቢ በዚህ ሊገደብ ችሏል። ስለሃብት ስርጭትና ሞኖፖሊ በማስረጃ ተደግፎ የቀረበውን ጥያቄ ጨምሮ ሰፊ ጉዳዮች በስብሰባው ላይ ተነስተው ነበር።

ተጋባዦቹ ጋዜጠኞች ፊትለፊት አውጥተው ባይናገሩም እስር ቤት ሆነውና፣ ኦጋዴን በአካል የታዘቡትን፣ እንዲሁም በግል ባሰባሰቡት መረጃ መሰረት በቅርቡ የሚያሳትሙት መጽሃፍ ታላቅ ዋጋ ያላቸው መረጃዎች የተካተቱበት እንደሚሆን የብዙዎች ግምት ነው። መጽሃፉ የሚታተምበት ትክክለኛ ጊዜ ባይታወቅም መጽሃፉ ከመረጃ ሰጪነቱና ኢህአዴግን ከማጋለጡ በተጨማሪ መንታ አላማ ማንገቡ የተገለጸው ሰዎቹ ከእስር እንደተፈቱ ነበር።

“በርግጥ ከእስር በመለቀቃችን እድለኞች ነን። ሆኖም ግን አዕምሯችን እረፍት አላገኘም። ምክንያቱም ብዙ ባልደረቦቻችን አሁንም እዚያው እስር ቤት ናቸው። የእስር ቤት ባልደረቦቻችን ባብዛኛው በምን ዓይነት ሁኔታ እንዳሉ ራሴን እጠይቃለሁ። እስር ቤቱ ጥሩ ስፍራ አይደለም። እንዲህ ባለ እስር ቤት ውስጥ መሞት ቀላል ነው። እኛ ከመንግስታችን ባገኘነዉ ትልቅ ድጋፍ ነጻ ወጥተናል። በርካቶች ግን አልታደሉም። ባልደረቦቻችን እዚያው ናቸው። አሁንም እዚያው ናቸው” ይህ ቃል ከእስር በተፈቱ ማግስት የተናገሩት ነው። ይህ ብቻም አይደለም በስማቸው የርዳታ ድርጅት በማቋቋም የህግ፣ የመድሃኒት፣ የእስረኞቹን ቤተሰቦች በገንዘብ ለመርዳት ቃልም ገብተው ነበር።

አትረሱ! ሚዲያ አይርሳችሁ! በሚዲያ መረሳት ሞት ነው! ነጻ ሚዲያ የሌለበት አገር አደጋ ውስጥ ነው! ነጻ ክርክርና ነጻ ሚዲያ የሌለበት አገር ሰላምና መረጋጋቱ አስተማማኝ አይደለም። ነጻ ሃሳብና ነጻ ህዝብ መፈጠር አለበት። የኢትዮጵያ ሕዝብ በታሪኩም ሆነ በማንነቱ ለነጻነት አዲስ አይደለም። በእስር ለሚማቅቁ መጮህና ደጋግሞ ያለመሰልቸት መከራከር የሚዲያዎች ሁሉ ቀዳሚ ተግባር ሊሆን ይገባል። እስረኞች ሲባሉ ደግሞ ሁሉንም ነው። በሚዲያ አትረሱ! ሚዲያ ያልደረሰላቸው ወገኖች የሚዲያ ያለህ የሚሉ ወገኖች አንደበትና ጠበቃ ከመሆን በላይ ታላቅ ስራ የለም። ብዙ የተረሱ አሉ።

source: http://www.goolgule.com/when-the-media-forgets/

ESAT Kignit OSLO, Norway Activist Tamagn Beyene Part I 15 February 2013...

ESAT Fundraising program OSLO NORWAY Feb 2013

Ethiopia uses Ginbot 7 pictures to plant spyware on computers

You Only Click Twice: FinFisher’s Global Proliferation

Authors: Morgan Marquis-Boire, Bill Marczak, Claudio Guarnieri, and John Scott-Railton.

This post describes the results of a comprehensive global Internet scan for the command and control servers of FinFisher’s surveillance software. It also details the discovery of a campaign using FinFisher in Ethiopia used to target individuals linked to an opposition group. Additionally, it provides examination of a FinSpy Mobile sample found in the wild, which appears to have been used in Vietnam.

Summary of Key Findings

• We have found command and control servers for FinSpy backdoors, part of Gamma International’s FinFisher “remote monitoring solution,” in a total of 25 countries: Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Qatar, Serbia, Singapore, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam.

• A FinSpy campaign in Ethiopia uses pictures of Ginbot 7, an Ethiopian opposition group, as bait to infect users. This continues the theme of FinSpy deployments with strong indications of politically-motivated targeting.

• There is strong evidence of a Vietnamese FinSpy Mobile Campaign. We found an Android FinSpy Mobile sample in the wild with a command & control server in Vietnam that also exfiltrates text messages to a local phone number.

• These findings call into question claims by Gamma International that previously reported servers were not part of their product line, and that previously discovered copies of their software were either stolen or demo copies.

1. Background and Introduction

FinFisher is a line of remote intrusion and surveillance software developed by Munich-based Gamma International GmbH. FinFisher products are marketed and sold exclusively to law enforcement and intelligence agencies by the UK-based Gamma Group.¹ Although touted as a “lawful interception” suite for monitoring criminals, FinFisher has gained notoriety because it has been used in targeted attacks against human rights campaigners and opposition activists in countries with questionable human rights records.²

In late July 2012, we published the results of an investigation into a suspicious e-mail campaign targeting Bahraini activists.³ We analyzed the attachments and discovered that they contained the FinSpy spyware, FinFisher’s remote monitoring product. FinSpy captures information from an infected computer, such as passwords and Skype calls, and sends the information to a FinSpy command & control (C2) server. The attachments we analyzed sent data to a command & control server inside Bahrain.

This discovery motivated researchers to search for other command & control servers to understand how widely FinFisher might be used. Claudio Guarnieri at Rapid7 (one of the authors of this report) was the first to search for these servers. He fingerprinted the Bahrain server and looked at historical Internet scanning data to identify other servers around the world that responded to the same fingerprint. Rapid7 published this list of servers, and described their fingerprinting technique. Other groups, including CrowdStrike andSpiderLabs also analyzed and published reports on FinSpy.

Immediately after publication, the servers were apparently updated to evade detection by the Rapid7 fingerprint. We devised a different fingerprinting technique and scanned portions of the internet. We confirmed Rapid7’s results, and also found several new servers, including one inside Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Communications. We published our list of servers in late August 2012, in addition to an analysis of mobile phone versions of FinSpy. FinSpy servers were apparently updated again in October 2012 to disable this newer fingerprinting technique, although it was never publicly described.

Nevertheless, via analysis of existing samples and observation of command & control servers, we managed to enumerate yet more fingerprinting methods and continue our survey of the internet for this surveillance software. We describe the results in this post.

Civil society groups have found cause for concern in these findings, as they indicate the use of FinFisher products by countries like Turkmenistan and Bahrain with problematic records on human rights, transparency, and rule of law. In an August 2012 response to a letter from UK-based NGO Privacy International, the UK Government revealed that at some unspecified time in the past, it had examined a version of FinSpy, and communicated to Gamma that a license would be required to export that version outside of the EU. Gamma has repeatedly denied links to spyware and servers uncovered by our research, claiming that the servers detected by our scans are “not … from the FinFisher product line.”⁴ Gamma also claims that the spyware sent to activists in Bahrain was an “old” demonstration version of FinSpy, stolen during a product presentation.

In February 2013, Privacy International, the European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights (ECCHR), the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, Bahrain Watch, and Reporters Without Borders filed a complaint with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), requesting that this body investigate whether Gamma violated OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises by exporting FinSpy to Bahrain. The complaint called previous Gamma statements into question, noting that at least two different versions (4.00 and 4.01) of FinSpy were found in Bahrain, and that Bahrain’s server was a FinFisher product and was likely receiving updates from Gamma. This complaint, as laid out by Privacy International states that Gamma:

• failed to respect the internationally recognised human rights of those affected by [its] activities
• caused and contributed to adverse human rights impacts in the course of [its] business activities
• failed to prevent and mitigate adverse human rights impacts linked to [its] activities and products, and failed to address such impacts where they have occurred
• failed to carry out adequate due diligence (including human rights due diligence); and
• failed to implement a policy commitment to respect human rights.

According to recent reporting, German Federal Police appear to have plans to purchase and use the FinFisher suite of tools domestically within Germany.⁵ Meanwhile, findings by our group and others continue to illustrate the global proliferation of FinFisher’s products. Research continues to uncover troubling cases of FinSpy in countries with dismal human rights track records, and politically repressive regimes. Most recently, work by Bahrain Watch has confirmed the presence of a Bahraini FinFisher campaign, and further contradicted Gamma’s public statements. This post adds to the list by providing an updated list of FinSpy Command & Control servers, and describing the FinSpy malware samples in the wild which appear to have been used to target victims in Ethiopia and Vietnam.

We present these updated findings in the hopes that we will further encourage civil society groups and competent investigative bodies to continue their scrutiny of Gamma’s activities, relevant export control issues, and the issue of the global and unregulated proliferation of surveillance malware.

2. FinFisher: Updated Global Scan

(click image to enlarge)

Figure 1. Map of global FinFisher proliferation

Around October 2012, we observed that the behavior of FinSpy servers began to change. Servers stopped responding to our fingerprint, which had exploited a quirk in the distinctive FinSpy wire protocol. We believe that this indicates that Gamma either independently changed the FinSpy protocol, or was able to determine key elements of our fingerprint, although it has never been publicly revealed.

In the wake of this apparent update to FinSpy command & control servers, we devised a new fingerprint and conducted a scan of the internet for FinSpy command & control servers. This scan took roughly two months and involved sending more than 12 billion packets. Our new scan identified a total of 36 FinSpy servers, 30 of which were new and 6 of which we had found during previous scanning. The servers operated in 19 different countries. Among the FinSpy servers we found, 7 were in countries we hadn’t seen before.

New Countries

Canada, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Mexico, Serbia, Vietnam

In our most recent scan, 16 servers that we had previously found did not show up. We suspect that after our earlier scans were published the operators moved them. Many of these servers were shut down or relocated after the publication of previous results, but before the apparent October 2012 update. We no longer found FinSpy servers in 4 countries where previous scanning identified them (Brunei, UAE, Latvia, and Mongolia). Taken together, FinSpy servers are currently, or have been present, in 25 countries.

Australia, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Brunei, Canada, Czech Republic, Estonia, Ethiopia, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Netherlands, Qatar, Serbia, Singapore, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Vietnam.

Importantly, we believe that our list of servers is incomplete due to the large diversity of ports used by FinSpy servers, as well as other efforts at concealment. Moreover, discovery of a FinSpy command and control server in a given country is not a sufficient indicator to conclude the use of FinFisher by that country’s law enforcement or intelligence agencies. In some cases, servers were found running on facilities provided by commercial hosting providers that could have been purchased by actors from any country.

The table below shows the FinSpy servers detected in our latest scan. We list the full IP address of servers that have been previously publicly revealed. For active servers that have not been publicly revealed, we list the first two octets only. Releasing complete IP addresses in the past has not proved useful, as the servers are quickly shut down and relocated.

IP	Operator	Routed to Country
117.121.xxx.xxx	GPLHost	Australia
77.69.181.162	Batelco ADSL Service	Bahrain
180.211.xxx.xxx	Telegraph & Telephone Board	Bangladesh
168.144.xxx.xxx	Softcom, Inc.	Canada
168.144.xxx.xxx	Softcom, Inc.	Canada
217.16.xxx.xxx	PIPNI VPS	Czech Republic
217.146.xxx.xxx	Zone Media UVS/Nodes	Estonia
213.55.99.74	Ethio Telecom	Estonia
80.156.xxx.xxx	Gamma International GmbH	Germany
37.200.xxx.xxx	JiffyBox Servers	Germany
178.77.xxx.xxx	HostEurope GmbH	Germany
119.18.xxx.xxx	HostGator	India
119.18.xxx.xxx	HostGator	India
118.97.xxx.xxx	PT Telkom	Indonesia
118.97.xxx.xxx	PT Telkom	Indonesia
103.28.xxx.xxx	PT Matrixnet Global	Indonesia
112.78.143.34	Biznet ISP	Indonesia
112.78.143.26	Biznet ISP	Indonesia
117.121.xxx.xxx	Iusacell PCS	Malaysia
201.122.xxx.xxx	UniNet	Mexico
164.138.xxx.xxx	Tilaa	Netherlands
164.138.28.2	Tilaa	Netherlands
78.100.57.165	Qtel – Government Relations	Qatar
195.178.xxx.xxx	Tri.d.o.o / Telekom Srbija	Serbia
117.121.xxx.xxx	GPLHost	Singapore
217.174.229.82	Ministry of Communications	Turkmenistan
72.22.xxx.xxx	iPower, Inc.	United States
166.143.xxx.xxx	Verizon Wireless	United States
117.121.xxx.xxx	GPLHost	United States
117.121.xxx.xxx	GPLHost	United States
117.121.xxx.xxx	GPLHost	United States
117.121.xxx.xxx	GPLHost	United States
183.91.xxx.xxx	CMC Telecom Infrastructure Company	Vietnam

Several of these findings are especially noteworthy:

• Eight servers are hosted by provider GPLHost in various countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, US). However, we observed only six of these servers active at any given time, suggesting that some IP addresses may have changed during our scans.
• A server identified in Germany has the registrant “Gamma International GmbH,” and the contact person is listed as “Martin Muench.”
• There is a FinSpy server in an IP range registered to “Verizon Wireless.” Verizon Wireless sells ranges of IP addresses to corporate customers, so this is not necessarily an indication that Verizon Wireless itself is operating the server, or that Verizon Wireless customers are being spied on.
• A server in Qatar that was previously detected by Rapid7 seems to be back online after being unresponsive during the last round of our scanning. The server is located in a range of 16 addresses registered to “Qtel – Corporate accounts – Government Relations.” The same block of 16 addresses also contains the websitehttp://qhotels.gov.qa/.

3. Ethiopia and Vietnam: In-depth Discussion of New Samples

3.1 FinSpy in Ethiopia

We analyzed a recently acquired malware sample and identified it as FinSpy. The malware uses images of members of the Ethiopian opposition group,  Ginbot 7, as bait. The malware communicates with a FinSpy Command & Control server in Ethiopia, which was first identified by Rapid7 in August 2012. The server has been detected in every round of scanning, and remains operational at the time of this writing. It can be found in the following address block run by Ethio Telecom, Ethiopia’s state-owned telecommunications provider:

IP: 213.55.99.74
route: 213.55.99.0/24
descr: Ethio Telecom
origin: AS24757
mnt-by: ETC-MNT
member-of: rs-ethiotelecom
source: RIPE # Filtered

The server appears to be updated in a manner consistent with other servers, including servers in Bahrain and Turkmenistan.

MD5	8ae2febe04102450fdbc26a38037c82b
SHA-1	1fd0a268086f8d13c6a3262d41cce13470886b09
SHA-256	ff6f0bcdb02a9a1c10da14a0844ed6ec6a68c13c04b4c122afc559d606762fa

The sample is similar to a previously analyzed sample of FinSpy malware sent to activists in Bahrain in 2012. Just like Bahraini samples, the malware relocates itself and drops a JPG image with the same filename as the sample when executed by an unsuspecting user. This appears to be an attempt to trick the victim into believing the opened file is not malicious. Here are a few key similarities between the samples:

• The PE timestamp “2011-07-05 08:25:31” of the packer is exactly the same as the Bahraini sample.
• The following string (found in a process infected with the malware), self-identifies the malware and is similar to strings found in the Bahraini samples:
  
• The samples share the same Bootkit, SHA-256: ba21e452ee5ff3478f21b293a134b30ebf6b7f4ec03f8c8153202a740d7978b2.
• The samples share the same driverw.sys file, SHA-256: 62bde3bac3782d36f9f2e56db097a4672e70463e11971fad5de060b191efb196.

Figure 2. The image shown to the victim contains pictures of members of the Ginbot 7 Ethiopian opposition group

In this case the picture contains photos of members of the Ethiopian opposition group,  Ginbot 7. Controversially, Ginbot 7 was designated a terrorist group by the Ethiopian Government in 2011. The Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and Human Rights Watch have both criticized this action, CPJ has pointed out that it is having a chilling effect on legitimate political reporting about the group and its leadership.

The existence of a FinSpy sample that contains Ethiopia-specific imagery, and that communicates with a still-active command & control server in Ethiopia strongly suggests that the Ethiopian Government is using FinSpy.

3.2 FinSpy Mobile in Vietnam

We recently obtained and analyzed a malware sample⁶ and identified it as FinSpy Mobile for Android. The sample communicates with a command & control server in Vietnam, and exfiltrates text messages to a Vietnamese telephone number.

The FinFisher suite includes mobile phone versions of FinSpy for all major platforms including iOS, Android, Windows Mobile, Symbian and Blackberry. Its features are broadly similar to the PC version of FinSpy identified in Bahrain, but it also contains mobile-specific features such as GPS tracking and functionality for silent ‘spy’ calls to snoop on conversations near the phone. An in-depth analysis of the FinSpy Mobile suite of backdoors was provided in an earlier blog post: The Smartphone Who Loved Me: FinFisher Goes Mobile?

MD5	573ef0b7ff1dab2c3f785ee46c51a54f
SHA-1	d58d4f6ad3235610bafba677b762f3872b0f67cb
SHA-256	363172a2f2b228c7b00b614178e4ffa00a3a124200ceef4e6d7edb25a4696345

The sample included a configuration file⁷ that indicates available functionality, and the options that have been enabled by those deploying it:

Figure 3. Image of a section of a configuration file for the FinSpy Mobile sample

Interestingly, the configuration file also specifies a Vietnamese phone number used for SMS based command and control:

Section Type: TlvTypeConfigSMSPhoneNumber
Section Data: “+841257725403″

The command and control server is in a range provided by the CMC Telecom Infrastructure Company in Hanoi:

IP Address: 183.91.2.199
inetnum: 183.91.0.0 – 183.91.9.255
netname: FTTX-NET
country: Vietnam
address: CMC Telecom Infrastructure Company
address: Tang 3, 16 Lieu Giai str, Ba Dinh, Ha Noi

This server was active until very recently and matched our signatures for a FinSpy command and control server. Both the command & control server IP and the phone number used for text-message exfiltration are in Vietnam which indicates a domestic campaign.

This apparent FinSpy deployment in Vietnam is troubling in the context of recent threats against online free expression and activism. In 2012, Vietnam introduced new censorship laws amidst an ongoing harassment, intimidation, and detention campaign against of bloggers who spoke out against the regime. This culminated in the trial of 17 bloggers, 14 of whom were recently convicted and sentenced to terms ranging from 3 to 13 years.⁸

4. Brief Discussion of Findings

Companies selling surveillance and intrusion software commonly claim that their tools are only used to track criminals and terrorists. FinFisher, VUPEN and Hacking Team have all used similar language.⁹ Yet a growing body of evidence suggests that these tools are regularly obtained by countries where dissenting political activity and speech is criminalized. Our findings highlight the increasing dissonance between Gamma’s public claims that FinSpy is used exclusively to track “bad guys” and the growing body of evidence suggesting that the tool has and continues to be used against opposition groups and human rights activists.

While our work highlights the human rights ramifications of the mis-use of this technology, it is clear that there are broader concerns.  A global and unregulated market for offensive digital tools potentially presents a novel risk to both national and corporate cyber-security. On March 12th, US Director of National Intelligence James Clapper stated in his yearly congressional report on security threats:

“…companies develop and sell professional-quality technologies to support cyberoperations–often branding these tools as lawful-intercept or defensive security research products. Foreign governments already use some of these tools to target U.S. systems.”

The unchecked global proliferation of products like FinFisher makes a strong case for policy debate about surveillance software and the commercialization of offensive cyber-capabilities.

Our latest findings give an updated look at the global proliferation of FinSpy. We identified 36 active FinSpy command & control servers, including 30 previously-unknown servers. Our list of servers is likely incomplete, as some FinSpy servers employ countermeasures to prevent detection. Including servers discovered last year, we now count FinSpy servers in 25 countries, including countries with troubling human rights records. This is indicative of a global trend towards the acquisition of offensive cyber-capabilities by non-democratic regimes from commercial Western companies.

The Vietnamese and Ethiopian FinSpy samples we identified warrant further investigation, especially given the poor human rights records of these countries. The fact that the Ethiopian version of FinSpy uses images of opposition members as bait suggests it may be used for politically influenced surveillance activities, rather than strictly law enforcement purposes.

The Ethiopian sample is the second FinSpy sample we have discovered that communicates with a server we identified by scanning as a FinSpy command & control server. This further validates our scanning results, and calls into question Gamma’s claim that such servers are “not … from the FinFisher product line.”¹⁰ Similarities between the Ethiopian sample and those used to target Bahraini activists also bring into question Gamma International’s earlier claims that the Bahrain samples were stolen demonstration copies.

While the sale of such intrusion and surveillance software is largely unregulated, the issue has drawn increased high-level scrutiny. In September of last year, the German foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, called for an EU-wide ban on the export of such surveillance software to totalitarian states.¹¹ In a December 2012 interview, Marietje Schaake (MEP), currently the rapporteur for the first EU strategy on digital freedom in foreign policy, stated that it was “quite shocking” that Europe companies continue to export repressive technologies to countries where the rule of law is in question.¹²

We urge civil society groups and journalists to follow up on our findings within affected countries. We also hope that our findings will provide valuable information to the ongoing technology and policy debate about surveillance software and the commercialisation of offensive cyber-capabilities.

Acknowledgements

We’d like to thank Eva Galperin and the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), Privacy International, Bahrain Watch, and Drew Hintz.

Media Coverage

Media coverage of the report includes HuffingtonPost Canada, Salon, The Verge,Bloomberg Business Week.

Footnotes

¹https://www.gammagroup.com/
²Software Meant to Fight Crime Is Used to Spy on Dissidents, http://goo.gl/GDRMe, New York Times, August 31, 2012, Page A1 Print edition.
³Cyber Attacks on Activists Traced to FinFisher Spyware of Gamma, http://goo.gl/nJH7o, Bloomberg, July 25, 2012
⁴http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/company-denies-role-in-recently-uncovered-spyware/
⁵http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/finfisher-entwickler-gamma-spam-vom-staat-1.1595253
⁶This sample has also been discussed by Denis Maslennikov from Kasperksy in his analyses of FinSpy Mobile –https://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792283/Mobile_Malware_Evolution_Part_6
⁷Configuration parsed with a tool written by Josh Grunzweig of Spider Labs –http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2012/09/finspy-mobile-configuration-and-insight.html
⁸https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/01/bloggers-trial-vietnam-are-part-ongoing-crackdown-free-expression
⁹https://www.securityweek.com/podcast-vupen-ceo-chaouki-bekrar-addresses-zero-day-marketplace-controversy-cansecwest
¹⁰http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/company-denies-role-in-recently-uncovered-spyware/
¹¹http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2012/nov/28/offshore-company-directors-military-intelligence
¹²http://www.vieuws.eu/foreign-affairs/digital-freedoms-marietje-schaake-mep-alde/

Post written by Morgan Marquis-Boire

Tagged: Ethiopia, FinFisher, Vietnam